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ABSTRACT 
The extension of political rights to corporations through Supreme Court decisions has 
altered the makeup of the plutocratic class in the United States. I argue that classifying campaign 
finance as a first amendment right afforded to corporate entities gave political power to corporate 
managers and shifted American political ideology in turn. This shift is reflected in government 
policies that prioritize the interests of the plutocratic class, resulting in a feedback loop that 
amplifies their wealth and power. This analysis will review the Supreme Court decisions that 
caused this, the subsequent polices, and how both contribute to the political power of corporate 
managers and owners. I will conclude by considering how this influenced the current political 
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The wealthy class have always held political power in any democracy, but there has been 
a noticeable shift in the behavior of Western democracies in the last four decades, particularly 
the United States. The American government has fashioned policies that are exclusively 
favorable to not just the wealthier class but specifically to corporate interests. This coupled with 
eroding support for the middle and working class has caused more extreme forms of populism to 
gain traction. Why are ostensibly democratic systems increasingly beholden to corporate 
interests? I argue that the answer lies in the legal evolution of corporate personhood. The 
Supreme Court has extended first amendment protections to corporate campaign financing and 
has therefore given political power to the managers of corporate capital. This created a sort of 
managerial class whose interests often align with that of the owner class and the two cooperate 
by using their respective influence, such as mass media or individual contributions. The Supreme 
Court cases in question authorized the uses of both corporate money and personal money to 
develop networks of political influence, with the owner class utilizing personal assets for 
extreme increases in individual contributions to advocacy groups and Super PACs and the 
managerial class using corporate revenue for political advertising and lobbying efforts. The 
landmark Supreme Court decisions of Buckley v. Valeo and First National Bank of Boston v. 
Belotti made it possible for the managers to use corporate money in ways that owners had long 
been using personal money for. The “corporate interests” are really the political interests of the 
managers who are free to use corporate funds to express the broader interests of the wealthy class 
with corporate personhood as an additional tool.  
 This research builds off Alfred Chandler’s seminal work by considering the 
political ramifications of modern enterprise, analyzing how the managerial class acquired and 
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exercises political power (Chandler 1977). Chandler’s concept of “managerial capitalism” is the 
ideal foundation for understanding the political influence of corporate personhood and why it has 
had such a profound effect on American governance (Chandler 1977). Chandler provides a 
useful framework for understanding modern economic structure but stops short of addressing 
their “impact on existing political and social arrangements” (Chandler 1977). This research is 
also a response to Hacker and Pierson’s argument that “policy drift”, or lack of policy reform, 
has produced our intensely stratified socioeconomic situation (Hacker and Pierson 2010). Their 
argument is correct if we assume the general goal of government policy is to satisfy the majority, 
i.e. the middle and working class, who have experienced economic stagnation and government 
inaction since 1980. However, the government has taken several actions to implement numerous 
policies to satisfy the managerial class, so the current socioeconomic stratification is more a 
result of reprioritization than inaction. The development of what Chandler calls managerial 
capitalism created this new socioeconomic class between that of the ultra-wealthy owners and 
the middle class and it was this managerial class’ push for political power that gave rise to 
neoliberalism and neoconservatism. This push was challenged in the courts and set important 
precedents that legitimized their influence and set the stage for it to flourish. The corporate 
managers’ acquisition of political power thus refocused policy objectives on their interests with 
the side effect of producing “policy drift” for the middle and working class (Hacker and Pierson 
2010). 
 This analysis will be divided into two parts. The first section will focus on the two 
of the four Supreme Court cases that protect corporate campaign financing and how these 
decisions affected the use of political money. As mentioned previously, the cases of Buckley v. 
Valeo (1976) and First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti (1978) are the cornerstones for this 
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shift. This section will examine the political context of these decisions and their broader 
implications. The dissenting opinions of Justice Byron White will receive special focus because 
he was mostly correct in his predictions concerning the effects of these decisions and his words 
are particularly relevant to contemporary American politics. Then I will analyze the effect these 
decisions had on the 1980 election, specifically the increases in private campaign funding and 
the effect this had on both the outcome and the future party platforms. This section will also 
review how the Reagan administration shifted the political objectives of conservatives to that of 
anti-government, anti-labor, and deregulation. Specifically, the many reforms to the tax code 
such as the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that sought to 
reduce government spending by choking its income, as well as Revenue Ruling 88-76 
concerning the IRS’ classification of LLCs (Field 2009). These policies are beneficial 
specifically to the managerial class and worked to strengthen their control over capital, which in 
turn gave them more resources to strengthen their political power.  
 The second section will then consider the now infamous Supreme Court case that 
extended corporate political power and played an important role in developing the current 
political scenario in the United States. The case in question is Citizens United v. FEC (2010), but 
to understand the reasoning of this case we must also consider Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce (1990) and McConnell v. FEC (2003). The Austin decision is the focal point of the 
debate in Citizens United because it restricted corporate speech in the context of campaign 
financing and was overruled by Citizens United. McConnel decision upheld the constitutionality 
of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act , and Citizens United overruled a portion of McConnell v. 
FEC concerning restrictions on corporate spending for electioneering communications. Citizens 
United ruled that corporate spending on political communications is protected by the first 
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amendment, which gave way to a massive surge in political advertising. This section will analyze 
the effect this ruling had on corporate political spending by examining corporate spending on 
traditional Political Action Committees (PACs) and the Koch brothers personal political 
spending on Super PACs. This comparison will represent the different relationship that the 
owner class has with political money versus the managerial class and finds that the owners’ 
individual contributions skyrocketed while the corporate donations to traditional PACs only saw 
a negligible increase. This is due to the symbiotic relationship between the two factions of the 
wealthy class and corporate managers having more effective political influence through public 
relations and mass media, with the owners’ having far more discretionary capital at their disposal 
which was now approved for unlimited spending. This interplay combined to boost the political 
power of the Tea Party movement and made far right populism a mainstream political ideology, 
which reflects the political ideology of large donors such as the Koch brothers.  
 I will conclude by expanding on these developments to consider the broader 
implications of corporate managerial political power and what its current role is in American 
politics. This section will examine how the ultra-conservative movement cultivated by the 
combined efforts of the plutocratic class produced the Trump Presidency and how that 
widespread support has influenced other politicians. I will consider how the Trump 
administration’s open embrace of corruption and corporate capital interests has eroded the 
legitimacy of public institutions and brought the United States to the brink of civil conflict. Then 
I will consider if any solutions could possibly diffuse this in the immediate short-term. Given the 
historical record, the outlook is grim.  
 The broader purpose of this research is to identify the policies that enable the 
managerial class to exercise political power and understand how this power is consolidated 
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through economic reforms. The American system of governance is highly dependent on financial 
institutions and corporate donors because of the way campaign financing has been transformed 
by these Supreme Court decisions. Politicians must cater to the managers of corporate capital to 
gain political traction because they ultimately hold the keys to electoral victory, ie large donor 
contributions and mass media influence. At first it was focused merely on economic gain and 
reducing the government’s control on the marketplace, but over time it has taken an a more 
ideological bent with alarming historical parallels. I argue that this created the hyper polarized 
political discourse in the United States that was seized upon by former President Trump to win 
the 2016 election and why there is fierce resistance to the legitimacy of current President Joe 
Biden’s electoral3 victory. This shift has also affected the perceived legitimacy of the 
Democratic Party, which was happy to partake in the economic benefits of campaign reform but 
have become the villains of far right populism and are increasingly viewed as corrupt by their 
own base.  
 The methodology for this research will be a qualitative assessment of primary 
documents that utilizes the framework of secondary sources to establish a unique argument. The 
primary documents in question are the previously mentioned Supreme Court cases, with specific 
attention to the dissent written by Justice Byron White, legislation such as Reagan’s tax policies, 
IRS Revenue rulings, and campaign financing reports. The secondary sources will be the works 
of Chandler, Hacker, and Pierson, as well as analyses of these developments that provide the 
necessary context, including a fascinating look at the development of the Tea Party by Theda 
Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson. My unique argument is that the managerial class has altered 
the makeup of the plutocratic class, specifically expanding its membership to a point where it can 
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be organized on both federal and state levels with cohesive interests that have become more 
ideologically extreme over time.  
1 SECTION 1: BUCKLEY V. VALEO, FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON V. 
BELOTTI, AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 
1.1.1 Buckley v. Valeo 
The landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo is the launch point of first amendment 
protections for campaign financing, which in turn is the basis for corporate managerial political 
power. This case was filed in response to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 because, 
“in the appellants’ view, limited the use of money for political purposes constitutes a restriction 
on communication violative of the First Amendment, since virtually all meaningful political 
communications in the modern setting involve the expenditure of money” and “the reporting and 
disclosure provisions of the Act unconstitutionally impinge on their right to freedom of 
association (Buckley v. Valeo 1976). The plaintiffs, Senator James L. Buckley and Senator 
Eugene McCarthy, argued “that contributions and expenditures are at the very core of political 
speech”, given how campaigns relied heavily on advertising and organizing public events 
(Buckley v. Valeo 1976). While the court recognized the Federal Election Campaign Act was 
“aimed in part at equalizing the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes” it found 
that the expenditure limits “reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues 
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached” (Buckley v. Valeo 
1976). The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the means of modern communication “requires 
the expenditure of money”, citing costs related to printing, rallies, radio and television ads, and 
mass news media (Buckley v. Valeo 1976). The shift to mass media reliance for public discourse 
necessitated the view that money is speech because the companies that owned the 
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communications infrastructure demanded payment for its use. The court’s decision legitimized 
the arrangement that privately held mass media is the primary forum for political expression 
despite the clear implications such an arrangement has regarding the equal access of that 
expression. Further, this decision gave the managers of these mass media companies significant 
political power because they were not obligated to provide equal access to those with the 
resources to pay for such access and they could direct political messaging at their own discretion. 
This factor is especially relevant to contemporary politics, where such managers have full time 
spokespeople for political ideologies.  
 The court had different views on contributions. It held that “a limitation on the 
amount of money a person may give…does not in any way infringe the contributors freedom to 
discuss candidates and issues” and “the overall effect of the Act’s contribution ceilings is merely 
to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons” 
(Buckley v. Valeo 1976). They recognized that capping the contributions made campaign 
financing more democratic and limited the influence any one contributor could have on a 
political campaign or prospective politician. However, by making a distinction between 
individual contributions and candidates’ personal expenditures on their own campaigns, the court 
undercut the democratizing effect of capping contribution amounts. Justice Byron White noted in 
his opinion that “limiting the importance of personal wealth…helps to assure that only 
individuals with a modicum of support from others will be viable candidates” and that the 
restrictions on personal spending would “equalize access to the political arena, encouraging the 
less wealthy, unable to bankroll their own campaigns, to run for political office” (Buckley v. 
Valeo 1976). This view outlines the relationship that political money has with both access to the 
political process and its influence on political platforms. Justice White understood that limiting 
8 
 
the amount of money anyone, including that candidates themselves, could put into a campaign 
served to make the entire process more equal and democratic. Justice White’s opinion also 
explicitly recognizes the disproportionate representation enjoyed by the wealthier class given 
that they had the resources to finance their own campaigns.  
 While this case did not directly hand power to corporate managers, it provides the 
legal basis for the contemporary political power of money and legitimizes private mass media 
companies as the arbiters of public discourse. The salient points made by Justice White regarding 
the importance of restricting personal contributions will be especially relevant to analyzing 
Citizens United, which opened up unlimited contributions to Super PACs and had an enormous 
impact on the overall direction of contemporary American politics. It is also important to 
establish Buckley v. Valeo as the background for analyzing the next Supreme Court decision of 
interest, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978), especially since it is explicitly cited in 
the appeal (First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 1978).  
1.1.2 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti  
This next case is a much clearer extension of constitutional protections to corporations 
that gave corporate managers a great deal of political power. The Court held that states could not 
create laws that “abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect” (Bellotti 
1978). The context here concerns the Massachusetts statute, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 55, § 8, 
that limited corporate speech to “issues that materially affect its business, property, or assets”, 
which was challenged by the First National Bank of Boston when its managers “wanted to spend 
money to publicize their views on a proposes constitutional amendment” concerning a graduated 
individual income tax (First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 1978). The Massachusetts 
Supreme Court cited Buckley v. Valeo by “acknowledging that § 8 operate[s] in an area of the 
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most fundamental First Amendment activities", and “viewed the principal question as ‘whether 
business corporations, such as [appellants], have First Amendment rights coextensive with those 
of natural persons or associations of natural persons", ie whether or not corporations could have 
first amendment rights (First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 1978). The Supreme Court saw 
this as the wrong question, and as previously noted instead framed the issue as whether a state 
could create statutes that abridge “expression” (First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 1978). 
It is interesting to note the distinction between the form of expression being protected vs. a 
corporation’s possession of constitutional rights, with political expenditures being a form of 
protected speech consistent with the Buckley v. Valeo decision. The basis for this is the court’s 
view of commercial speech as necessary for the “free flow of information” and that the first 
amendment “prohibit government from limiting the stock of information” (First National Bank 
of Boston v. Bellotti 1978). Whether the source of the information is a corporation or an 
individual is irrelevant because the court views all “speech that otherwise would be within the 
protection of the First Amendment” cannot lose said protection on that basis (First National Bank 
of Boston v. Bellotti 1978). A later iteration of the Court would rule the other way in Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), indicating that this more extreme impartiality is 
dependent on the ideological leanings of the Court rather than a consistent practice of the 
institution itself. Ideology has increasingly become the focal point of our political discourse, and 
the Court has proven to be equally susceptible to ideological splits.  
 Taken together, these decisions gave corporate managers the right to utilize 
corporate funds for political expenditures beyond the immediate concerns of the corporation 
itself. In his dissent, Justice White pointed out that “The Court invalidates the Massachusetts 
statute and holds that the First Amendment guarantees corporate managers the right to use not 
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only their personal funds, but also those of the corporation, to circulate fact and 
opinion…necessarily representing their own personal of collective views about political and 
social questions” First National Bank of Boston v. (Belotti 1978, Justice White dissenting). 
Additionally, Justice White viewed this decision as a restriction of the State of Massachusetts’ 
First Amendment rights, specifically the states regulatory power to protect the shareholders from 
having their money used to express views they disagree with (First National Bank of Boston v. 
Belotti 1978, Justice White dissenting). Justice White correctly viewed corporate political 
expenditures as the corporate managers’ political expression independent of the shareholders and 
that this decision allowed them to use shareholder investments to further their political 
objectives. The use of these funds significantly increases the scope of political expression 
available to corporate managers and grants them disproportional representation in public 
discourse. Justice White noted “that the special status of corporations has placed them in a 
position to control vast amounts of economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate not 
only the economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the electoral process” (First National 
Bank of Boston v. Belotti 1978, Justice White dissenting). White argued that the special status 
afforded to corporate entities by states that allows them to be more profitable and economically 
viable should not be leveraged for political advantage and that if the state did not regulate such 
expenditures then it was favoring corporate political objectives by default (First National Bank 
of Boston v. Belotti 1978, Justice White dissenting). Additionally, White argued that allowing 
corporate managers to use corporate money for political purposes that were against the views of 
the shareholders not only infringes shareholders’ First Amendment rights but is also inconsistent 
with how the court had ruled previously concerning political money. Justice White goes on to 
cite Machinists v. Street (1961), where a railway “union shop authorized by the Railway Labor 
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Act, had used the union treasury to which all employees were compelled to contribute ‘to finance 
campaigns of candidates for federal and state offices whom [the petitioners] opposed, and to 
promote the propagation of political and economic doctrines, concepts, and ideologies with 
which [they] disagree” and the Court “construed the [Railway Labor] Act to prohibit the use of 
compulsory union dues for political purposes” (Machinists v. Street 1961, First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti 1978, Justice White dissenting).  Justice White also cites Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education, another case where the Court ruled that union dues could not be used for 
political purposes (First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti 1978, Justice White dissenting). By 
ruling against union use of political money and for corporate use of political money, the Court is 
making a distinction between different types of political money where an organization’s use of 
money that was amassed for other purposes violates contributors’ First Amendment rights if the 
money is union dues but is a protected form of expression if the money is liquid corporate 
revenue. This distinction essentially establishes a sort of corporate personhood where the 
corporation’s revenue is given the same political use protections as personal funds possessed by 
individuals. Absent, however, is the notion that the personal funds of the owners is also a 
byproduct of the corporation’s special status, which is understandable given that at the time there 
were restrictions on individual contributions and the loopholes around them were limited.  
 Justice White’s dissention also brings up the possibility for this money to become 
a corrupting influence and create political debts. He criticizes the Court’s relative indifference to 
corruption, citing Buckley v. Valeo where, “the Court has previously held in Buckley v. Valeo 
that the interest in preventing corruption is insufficient to justify restrictions upon individual 
expenditures relative to candidates for political office” and notes that “corporate contributions to 
and expenditures on behalf of political candidates may be no more limited than those of 
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individuals. Individual contributions under federal law are limited but not entirely forbidden, and 
under Buckley v. Valeo expenditures may not be constitutionally limited at all” (First National 
Bank of Boston v. Belotti 1978, Justice White dissenting). He goes on to say that the 
Massachusetts statute was justified in limiting corporate speech because it protects the overall 
“system of freedom of expression”  and the statute sought to prevent corporate dominance in the 
electoral process First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti 1978, Justice White dissenting).  
 Justice White’s dissent is a prophetic criticism that clearly understands the 
breadth of implications for this ruling’s effect on political money. He outlines how corporate 
managers were being handed an enormous amount of political power by being able to dominate 
campaign financing and bring about politicians indebted them. The Court’s decision that States 
could not restrict campaign financing under the First Amendment should not have been 
considered in a vacuum without regard to the economic advantages afforded to corporations and 
the distorting effect those advantages have on the way political money is used. The fallout of this 
decision is far reaching and has affected the electoral process in precisely the ways Justice White 
said that it would, starting with the 1980 election.  
1.1.3 The 1980 election and Reagan administration 
The 1980 election saw a shift in campaign financing that was a direct response to the 
Buckley v. Valeo decision to allow for unlimited expenditures by independent committees 
(Briffault 1984). The Court neglected the Federal Election Campaign Act provision that 
restricted the expenditures of independent committees in the Buckley decision since the previous 
arrangement of unlimited contributions negated the need for independent committees (Briffault 
1984). The response was for independent committees to become vehicles of general support 
instead of purely issue focused, which led to an enormous increase in private spending for the 
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1980 election, specifically “the additional $10.6 million spent by private committees to 
disseminate pro-Reagan communications enhanced Reagan’s spending by one-third over the 
public grant while Carter was the beneficiary of less than $30,000 in independent expenditures 
(Briffault 1980). This is clear evidence of the issues Justice White raised in his dissent, where the 
vast resources of corporate wealth could be organized to swamp election cycles with private 
money that far outweighed the allotment for public funding. While private money has always 
had a big influence on politics, the policy developments made through the Federal Election 
Campaign Act and the subsequent Buckley v. Valeo decision created an electoral system that 
necessitated organization among contributors rather than between contributors and the candidates 
themselves (Briffault 1984). This means that people with access to and influence within 
corporate networks would already have the necessary logistical capabilities and resources to 
independently coordinate support for any candidate, party, or policy they supported through 
these committees and the Bellotti decision allowed them to use corporate revenue to fund said 
committees. This gave corporate managers a legitimate political position to work alongside the 
owners because their interests aligned as a socioeconomic class and together they have far more 
funds at their disposal. Another side effect of this was the rise of Political Action Committees 
(PACs), which drew significant funding from business contributors and were responsible for 
large portions of all campaign financing in the 1980 election (Briffault 1984). While the 
traditional PACs of this era were nowhere near as well-funded or influential as the now infamous 
Super PACs would be, they were an important early conduit for corporate political expression 




 The result of this shift in the way political money is amassed and spent has “led to 
a politics in which fund-raising is a continuous activity”, mirroring the way corporations are 
managed and creating a symbiotic relationship between corporate managers and politicians 
(Briffault 1984, Drew 1983). This in turn creates a “structural skewing of the congressional 
agenda” where campaign financing begets policy decisions beholden to the financers and 
“converts the political process into a mechanism for reinforcing inequalities in society” (Briffault 
1984, Drew 1983). We can therefore view subsequent economic policies as direct consequences 
of the empowerment of corporate managers by way of campaign finance reform. This is 
substantiated by the clear shift in socioeconomic priorities under the Reagan administration, 
specifically the tax reforms, IRS rulings, deregulation initiatives, and attacks on organized labor. 
The success of this legislation was predicated on a united effort between the executive and 
legislative and the Republican Party’s ability to pass these policies was won due to these changes 
in campaign financing. The effects of said legislation were a net benefit to corporate managers at 
the expense of stable government revenue, which produced a much larger deficit since the 
reduced tax revenues did not force spending cuts (Samuelson 1987). The Economic Tax 
Recovery Act of 1981 marks the beginning of the policy shift to favor the managerial class and 
was the prize for their extensive investments in the 1980 election. Despite the deficit created by 
the Reagan administration’s policies, tax cuts became a cornerstone of the Republican party 
platform as they are a consistently popular policy (Prasad 2012). However, the tax cuts on their 
own were not enough to sway the general public, as evidenced by the weaker than expected 
gains for the Republicans in the 1978 midterm election (Prasad 2012). It wasn’t until after 
corporate funds were unleashed by the Supreme Court that the Republicans were able to make 
the gains they had been strategizing for. The managerial class’ access to and control of media 
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networks and pooled political money popularized these ideas on a scale that individual 
politicians were unable to accomplish. President Reagan himself has transformed into somewhat 
of a mythical figure in conservative politics, with his appeals to unite religious groups with 
small-government business people becoming foundational to the ideology of neoconservatism. 
 Deregulation has become another cornerstone of conservative political platforms 
that has had a net benefit to corporate managers at the expense of the broader public. The Reagan 
administration made major changes such as the deregulation of the broadcasting industry, the 
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act, the opening of federal lands to the oil industry, 
and the defunding of the EPA (Leuchtenberg 2015). This deregulation should be considered in 
tandem with Reagan’s labor policies, such as the breaking of the Professional Air Traffic 
Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike, his appointments to the National Labor Relations 
Board, and the downstream effects these decisions had on organized labor (Rossinow 2015). 
Organized labor had long been a threat to plutocratic power and for much of the early twentieth 
century it seemed that the political revolution would come through labor unions. The wealthy 
class’ fears over labor movements escalated steadily over the course of the Cold War and fueled 
the Reagan administration’s anti-labor policies. The empowerment of the corporate managers 
and their increased influence over the Republican Party crippled the political power of unions, 
which has had lasting consequences for the middle class. These policy choices went a long way 
in reducing the type of oversight that the ownership class had historically fought against, and it 
took the political power of the managerial class to succeed.   
 Another key policy victory for corporate managers was Revenue Ruling 88-76, 
which classified limited liability corporations (LLCs) as partnerships was based on them lacking 
corporate characteristics iii (continuity of life) and vi (free transferability of interests) as 
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specified by the Kintner regulations, legally establishing the entity’s rights as separate from its 
managers and members (Field 2009). LLCs were conceived as a method of subverting specific 
tax regulations and following the IRS decision they were used to manipulate the arbitrary legal 
differences between partnerships and corporations to achieve those ends (Field 2009). The 
primary consequence of this is that it blurred the legal distinction between individuals and 
corporations, further allowing corporate managers to accrue greater wealth at minimal risk.  
 Overall, these landmark court decisions paved the way for a more robust 
plutocratic class that combined corporate managers with owners to assert influence over 
elections and subsequently the broader direction of political ideology. However, the full weight 
of these decisions would not be realized until decades later.  
2 SECTION 2: CITIZENS UNITED, THE KOCH BROTHERS, AND THE TEA 
PARTY 
2.1.1 Citizens United  
The case of Citizens United v. the Federal Election Commission (2010) adheres to the 
idea that “political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it by design or 
inadvertence” (Citizens United v. FEC 2010). The ruling cites both Buckley v. Valeo and First 
National Bank of Boston v. Belotti, specifically that the former “invalidated the expenditure 
ban…because it failed to serve any substantial government interest in stemming the reality or 
appearance of corruption” and that the latter “recognized that the First Amendment applies to 
corporations…and extended this protection to the context of political speech” (Citizens United v. 
FEC 2010). This would seem to confirm the sort of “feedback loop” that has occurred where 
corporate personhood sets precedents that enhance the political power of corporate managers and 
are subsequently cited in future rulings to do so again when corporate managers come up with 
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new strategies to challenge corporate political regulations. However, the ideological makeup of 
the Court itself changes over time, which created a back and forth concerning the political speech 
rights of corporations. The ruling cites Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), which 
held that “political speech may be banned based on the speaker’s corporate identity” as the basis 
for the McConnell v. FEC (2003) ruling which upheld the limits imposed on electioneering 
communications imposed by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (Citizens United v. 
FEC 2010). The Austin ruling echoes the dissenting opinion of Justice White in “recognizing a 
new governmental interest in preventing ‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of [corporate] wealth…that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for 
the corporation’s political ideas” (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce 1990). Citizens United explicitly overturns the Austin ruling, where “a pre-Austin 
line forbidding speech restrictions based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-Austin 
line permitting them. Neither Austin’s anti-distortion rationale nor the Government’s other 
justifications support § 441b's restrictions” and cites Bellotti as precedent, where “political 
speech is indispensable to decision-making in a democracy and this is no less true because 
speech comes from a corporation” (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, First National Bank of Boston 
v. Bellotti 1978). The Court is again taking the stance that advantages afforded to the wealthy or 
corporations are not sufficient justification for restricting their speech, saying “it is irrelevant for 
First Amendment purposes that corporate funds may have little or no correlation to the publics 
support for the corporation’s political ideas” (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce 1990). The Court goes on to say that the anti-distortion rationale could 
also be used to restrict the political speech of media corporations and such a policy would be 
wholly unconstitutional (Citizens United v. FEC 2010). This is a literal interpretation of the First 
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Amendment that is willfully detached from the implications of unrestricted corporate political 
speech. Both the Buckley and Bellotti rulings are again cited where the Court holds that 
independent expenditures do not affect corruption and that having influence over elected officials 
does not corrupt said officials (Citizens United v. FEC 2010). These conclusions are tacit 
approval of corporate influence over politicians that extends the political influence of corporate 
managers far beyond the protections for political spending afforded to them by the Buckley and 
Bellotti cases. That this decision fell along ideological lines, with conservative leaning justice 
holding a majority, signals the broader aim of the decision and who will benefit from it, ie the 
neoconservative business faction. Of note is the Court’s wording of “no sufficient governmental 
interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations”, 
distinguishing the interests of the public from that of the government ostensibly representing said 
public (Citizens United v. FEC 2010). Such an understanding of the government as a separate 
entity acting in its self-interest is arguably consistent with the neoconservative perspective, 
especially considering their concern over the national deficit and cutting social programs to 
address it, though the American way of government is rooted in this concept and the Constitution 
is written with the assumption that the government is adversarial to the public. The Court also 
consistently uses this language in other decisions, so Citizens United does not set a precedent for 
this.  
 Overall, the decision outlines the importance of the precedents set by the Buckley 
and Bellotti Court, since both cases were cited as the primary reasoning for overturning the 
Austin decision. It also reaffirms the Court’s custom of considering the letter of the law in a 
vacuum, where “the rule that political speech cannot be limited based on a speaker’s wealth is a 
necessary consequence of the premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the 
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suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity” (Citizens United v. FEC 2010). 
This is a conservative understanding of the Supreme Court’s responsibility, that the Court should 
only determine the literal constitutionality of a law without regard to the broader implications. 
This is despite the Court’s primary responsibility of acting as a check on the other branches, not 
merely arbiters of the constitution. Chief Justice Roberts concurring opinion notes that such 
prohibitions would subvert public discourse because corporations own all of the major 
newspapers and broadcasting systems, which again echoes the Buckley and Bellotti Court’s 
justification for unlimited expenditures (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, Justice Roberts 
concurring). Justice Stevens dissent drives at the problem with this reasoning, “Even more 
misguided is the notion that the Court must rewrite the law relating to campaign expenditures by 
for-profit corporations and unions to decide this case” and “The conceit that corporations must 
be treated identically to natural persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also 
inadequate to justify the Court’s disposition of this case” (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, Justice 
Stevens dissenting). Justice Stevens points out that corporations cannot run for office or vote and 
because they can be controlled by non-citizens their interests are not necessarily aligned with the 
public (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, Justice Stevens dissenting). These points about corporate 
personhood and international corporate managers is perhaps the most salient of Stevens’ 
dissenting opinion. Since a corporation itself is not a person, constitutional protections afforded 
to them are thereby extended to corporate managers that control them, including non-citizens. 
Not only does this give credence to the anti-distortion rationale of the Austin decision, it is also a 
glaring election security flaw, which is especially concerning in the wake of the 2016 election 
and the accusations of foreign interference. Justice Stevens further derides the decision by citing 
the long history of limitations on corporate campaign spending, including the Tilman Act of 
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1907, FEC v. National Right to Work Comm. (1982), FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 
(2007), McConnell v. FEC (2003), FEC v. Beaumont (2003), among others (Citizens United v. 
FEC 2010, Justice Stevens dissenting). This point makes it clear that Citizens United, Buckley, 
and Bellotti are unusual in the history of the Court and the former’s reliance on the latter two as 
precedent is willfully ignoring the more robust precedents that would negate them. Justice 
Stevens takes care to warn that “The Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of 
elected institutions across the Nation” as well as “do damage to this institution [The Court]” 
(Citizens United v. FEC 2010, Justice Stevens dissenting).  Clearly Justice Stevens and those that 
joined his dissent understood the broader implications of this decision, which emphasizes how 
this was a turning point that has led us to the current situation. He even goes as far as accusing 
his colleagues of seizing on this case as an “opportunity to change the law”, arguing that the 
original scope of the case did not merit such a decision and that the case was changed to suit the 
other Justices desires (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, Justice Stevens dissenting). The dissent 
breaks down the inconsistencies in the case law to back up this claim and makes a convincing 
argument that the conservative Justices were ethically negligent, pointing out that the Austin or 
McConnell decisions were even more justifiable precedents than Buckley v. Valeo and that “the 
only thing preventing the majority from affirming the District Court, or adopting a narrower 
ground that would retain Austin, is its disdain for Austin” (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, Justice 
Stevens dissenting). According to Justice Stevens, the authority held by state legislatures to 
regulate corporate electioneering was confirmed by the Austin decision, that Congress used the 
Austin decision as the foundation for the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), and that 
this decision “shows great disrespect for a coequal branch” and that “the only relevant thing that 
has changed since Austin and McConnell is the composition of this Court” (Citizens United v. 
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FEC 2010, Justice Stevens dissenting). He rejects the absolutist interpretation of the First 
Amendment given the various exceptions the government has implemented with no challenge 
from the Court.  
 Justice Stevens dissent is illuminating and provides an interesting case study of 
the Court’s ideological split. The more conservative Justices sought to overturn a very specific 
decision that had already been an accepted part of the law for nearly two decades by the time of 
review and their rhetoric about corporate political speech being outright banned by it was 
duplicitous when placed in context with the history of political speech regulation. Here we see a 
clear push for political power from neoconservative Justices who were appointed by 
neoconservative politicians who are representatives of corporate managerial power. From this 
perspective the damage to the Court that Justice Stevens feared had already been done and this 
decision was just a more severe symptom of the institutional corruption that had already taken 
root in the federal government. The influence of corporate money in politics had been steadily 
increasing since the Buckley decision, and as legislative seats became reliable constants while 
presidential platforms veered further right, the justices they appointed represented the same far 
right ideology that valued factional loyalty and embraced an anti-government, pro-business 
mindset. These latter cases sought to simplify the process and allow corporate managers and 
owners to put more money in one place, making effective coordination much easier to carry out. 
The McConnell case was the previous push to consolidate corporate influence over elections and 
Senator McConnell has become infamous for his work in the years following. The changes 
following the Buckley and Bellotti decisions revealed an effective tool for gaining greater power 
from a symbiotic relationship between corporate managers and political parties. The Austin 
decision was the primary obstacle to even greater power, and from Justice Stevens account it 
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appears that Citizens United was a more a concerted effort to remove that obstacle than a debate 
over the First Amendment. Citizens United then was the last step in fully opening political 
fundraising to corporate donors, built off the foundation of Buckley and Bellotti. It protected an 
already corrupt system of campaign financing and made it easier to launder money through the 
newly created Super PACs. It was also the warning shot of the hard ideological turn that 
mainstream politics was about to take. 
2.1.2 The Koch brothers and the Tea Party 
The immediate impact of this decision was not the use of corporate funds but a dramatic 
increase in independent expenditures on Super PACs (Hansen, Rocca, and Ortiz 2015). In their 
2015 analysis, Wendy Hansen et al note that while corporate political expenditures, it was 
statistically insignificant, especially compared to the 594% increase in individual expenditures 
(Hansen et al 2015). This would suggest that the ownership class has mostly taken advantage of 
the new spending tools afforded to them by Citizens United. That same study notes that the Koch 
brothers’ own Super PAC, Americans for Prosperity, spent $33,542,058 while Koch Industries 
only spent $1,100 through its treasury (Hansen et al 2015). The Koch brothers offer an 
interesting case study of political spending since they used much of their personal wealth to build 
a network of conservative advocacy while also managing their own corporation, serving as a 
nexus of ownership and managerial class benefits. We must here consider that the corporate 
managers and the corporate owners benefit collectively as a plutocratic class and may maneuver 
independently if it is more efficient and beneficial to do so. The Hansen et al study points out 
that corporations have specific public relations needs that may be best served by avoiding Super 
PAC donations with treasury funds, while the personal funds of the owners, such as the Koch 
brothers, are not bound by traditional arrangements and can therefore be spent with less caution 
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(Hansen et al 2015). Distinguishing between the corporate treasury funds and the personal wealth 
of the company owners seems like a hollow difference, though, given that the owners’ wealth is 
derived from the company’s revenue and their socioeconomic interests are focused around 
ensuring their company’s success.  
 The takeaway here is that the corporate managers have gained membership in the 
plutocratic class and their interests now parallel that of the owners. The Buckley and Bellotti 
decisions were the primary drivers of corporate managers gaining political relevance, and it was 
the political actions of corporate managers that spurred the Citizens United case. As the 
managerial class gained political influence, it also increased the political power of the ownership 
class, thus binding the two together into a political faction with shared goals and ideologies. 
While it is possible that the two might have organized into such a faction in the absence of the 
Court’s campaign finance reforms, the effect of the Court’s decision to allow money to translate 
into political influence cannot be ignored. These decisions transformed the way elections are 
conducted and who dictates the important issues, and the people with the most capital have 
benefitted from cooperating. It also cannot be overstated how important ideology has been to this 
process and it clearly originated within said companies’ internal business culture that is enforced 
by the managers given that they control personnel decisions. Giving greater political power to 
these groups brought this culture into government institutions, as evidenced by the corporate 
positions held by politicians both before and after serving office and the manner in which 
political personnel decisions are made.  
 The other effect of these decisions has been the rapid polarization of American 
political discourse. The creation of Super PACs and the unlimited political spending afforded to 
them has produced a well-funded and highly organized system of conservative advocacy groups 
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and think tanks that have worked to disseminate their shared ideology to the broader public, such 
as the previously mentioned Koch brothers’ Super PAC Americans for Prosperity, as well as 
America First Action, Preserve America PAC, and American Crossroads. Combined, these 
groups spend hundreds of millions of dollars on political advertising to make their views as 
mainstream as possible and have seen resounding success. Their efforts have directly contributed 
to the hyper polarized partisan politics of recent years that has focused on cultural identity. The 
political results of this were first the Tea Party or Freedom Caucus, which was an ultra-
conservative group of Republicans in the House of Representative during the Obama 
administration and was arguably the flashpoint of contemporary conservative populism in 
American politics. This movement legitimized the political ideology of the Koch brothers and 
successfully shifted mainstream political discourse much further to the right. Their political 
objectives echoed the Reagan administration, “to reduce taxes, slash public spending, curb public 
sector unions, and clear away regulations on businesses” while adding the decidedly more 
ideological goals of “policing immigrants, safeguarding Second Amendment gun rights, and 
promoting pro-life and traditional family values” (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). While the 
broader Tea Party movement had a degree of grassroots organization that had started taking off 
in 2009, they would not have gained as much traction or won elections without funding from 
Americans for Prosperity, which was only able to do so because of the Citizens United decision 
in early 2010. The plutocratic class saw the nascent Tea Party movement as an opportunity to 
take control of the Republican Party platform and mobilized their respective assets and influence 
to support it (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). The ownership class contributed the massive 
electoral donations while the corporate managers began recruiting Tea Party spokespeople for 
the media to signal boost their “ultra-free market conservatism” (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). 
25 
 
Corporate media had long been the arbiter of public discourse, as previously noted when it was 
used to justify the unlimited expenditures portion of the Buckley decision, and so as the 
corporate managers of media companies either became believers in the Tea Party platform or 
chased the incoming revenue from Super PACs and advocacy groups. The combined influence of 
billionaire owners such as the Koch brothers and the corporate managers control of mass media 
catapulted the Tea Party into national relevance and legitimate political power. Citizens United 
worked to solidify this symbiotic relationship by providing an effective vehicle for unlimited 
individual donations to be used for coordinating national level political strategies that leveraged 
mass media influence to win elections. The grassroots origins of the Tea Party lent them an air of 
populist legitimacy despite their deep connections to established large donors in Washington and 
thus the corporate managers’ and owners’ political goals gained widespread support (Skocpol 
and Williamson 2012). This movement would eventually coalesce around Donald Trump 
because he managed to fuse corporate interests with the populist rhetoric that the more extreme 
Tea Party members were calling for.  
 The broader effect this has had in the decade since has been to cement the 
Republican Party platform as an uncompromising pro-corporate party that can rely on every vote 
sticking to the party line because of the sophisticated network of conservative advocacy 
developed by the plutocratic donors. The cultural and ideological slant of their advocacy tactics 
has allowed them to consolidate influence over rural politics, many state legislatures, and the 
federal branches. This influence is also not unique to the Republican Party, as the Democrats are 
experiencing an identity crisis split between the small progressive faction of the party and the 
moderate centrists who receive campaign funding from the large corporate donors. The anti-
government rhetoric of the Tea Party has delegitimized the Democratic Party among the 
26 
 
conservative faithful while the Democrats’ willingness to accept the same corporate funds as 
their rivals delegitimizes them to the progressive liberal portion of their own party. Senator 
Bernie Sanders famously refused to accept large donations and garnered a great deal of 
progressive populist support with young voters, but was unable to cultivate enough broader 
support to win primaries because of the consolidated right wing influence outside of the cities 
and the corporate mass media framing him as a radical socialist. It is impossible to guess how a 
Sanders candidacy would’ve performed, given the enormous percentage of non-voters in the last 
two Presidential elections while the more moderate swing voters may have voted against him. 
That he is considered unelectable despite his grassroots support is arguably more indicative of 
the ideology of media companies and the amount of PAC money they receive than any actual 
measure of his public support. However, the results of the 2020 election would suggest that the 
climate of American politics is far more right-wing than anyone would’ve guessed during the 
Obama administration. Again, I argue that this is because of the relentless influence of corporate-
backed messaging that has invested vast amounts of capital into a constant campaign to push 
American politics towards their ideology and subsequent benefit. The downstream result is an 
electorate that favors right-wing politicians and vote accordingly, compounding the institutional 
problems previously mentioned. After a decade of this, public discourse has reached near fever-
pitch, where calls for progressive legislation are met with outright hostility by both the 
Republican Party and the public. Most alarmingly is their enthusiasm in organizing a cult of 
personality around former President Donald Trump, whose explicitly nationalist and 
authoritarian rhetoric is the clearest warning yet that this movement is not satisfied with 




The expansion of corporate first amendment rights by way of landmark Supreme Court 
decisions gave corporate managers the necessary tools to assert significant political influence and 
consolidate political power over the last forty years. The Supreme Court dismissed the concerns 
for potential corruption and disproportionate representation that inevitably arose from these 
precedents and instead only considered the constitutionality of the government’s attempts to 
restrict corporate campaign financing. The Court even went as far as reversing previous rulings 
that had held the government’s ability to restrict corporate speech. The effect this has had on 
mainstream American politics is to shift the Overton window to the extreme right. Corporate 
political advertising has become a self-sustaining industry that fuses propaganda with marketing 
to ensure popular support for candidates who will provide the managerial class their preferred 
policies. The obvious culprits are the Republican Party, but this is a bipartisan problem since the 
Democratic Party’s core leadership follows mostly right-wing, pro-corporate economic policies 
as well because they receive most of their campaign financing from the very same corporate 
managers as their Republican counterparts. This has sowed intense public distrust in the 
government to such a degree that populism has gained traction among millions. The factional 
tensions that have long-plagued American political discourse have been amplified by this and 
begun to destabilize broader society, culminating in the Capitol riot on January 6, 2021.  
 The corporate managers have managed to leverage their position as economic 
planners and capitalize on deregulated markets to expand the wealth available to them far beyond 
what the Buckley-era Court could have conceived. Now even minor Congressional elections in 
small districts become multi-million dollar affairs with enormous advertising budgets. This 
makes it nearly impossible for a candidate to compete without corporate support and effectively 
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neutralizes the so-called “marketplace of ideas”. While the rise of the internet and social media 
have facilitated certain populist ideas gaining more mainstream traction, the political status quo 
has resisted much of the ideas that challenge corporate managers’ political power. Despite 
consistently raising considerable funds from small donors, Senator Bernie Sanders has failed in 
his bids for the Democratic primary, with the DNC instead favoring more corporate-friendly 
right-wing candidates like Hillary Clinton and President Joe Biden. Former President Trump 
arguably was only ousted because his administration had become an economic liability in the 
wake of his mismanagement of the pandemic response, though he still enjoys widespread support 
and several large companies have actually seen revenue spikes because of the pandemic (Arora 
2020).  
 The calls for money to be taken out of politics have gotten louder considering the 
blatant corruption of the Trump administration, but this is hollow rhetoric given the Court’s 
comprehensive decision that corporate political money cannot be restricted. The reality is that 
corporate managers are firmly entrenched members of the plutocratic class with vast resources at 
their disposal and extensive influence over the government that all but guarantees their money 
will not be refused. The mass media conglomerates the managerial class operates have even 
cultivated a populist movement to support their unabridged political power, framing it as a 
greater freedom only afforded to Americans as a reward for success. This has caused the 
Republican Party to metastasize into an extreme pro-corporate neo-fascist party that prioritizes 
extending the plutocratic class’ economic dominance over the marketplace and restricting any 
attempts to mitigate it. These developments would not have been possible without the political 
relevance of the managerial class that coincided with the technological breakthroughs in mass 
media and the transformation of the United States into an information economy. This change has 
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produced a massive increase in the scale of corporate employment and the number of middle 
managers necessary for operations. Their political empowerment gives plutocratic policies the 
veneer of democratic support since there are enough of them to give the illusion that their beliefs 
are widespread, especially with how social media monopolization bottle necks the distillation of 
information and the companies that own the platforms favor right-wing ideas. The current state 
of social media in the United States is also a significant national security risk, given that such 
platforms are only internally regulated, prioritize revenue over the public good, and collect 
extensive amounts of data on all citizens that is then sold to the highest bidder.  These platforms 
also play host to a number of extremist domestic terror groups who use the platforms for 
recruitment and to normalize their views to the general public.  
 By allowing corporate managers to use corporate revenue gains and media 
infrastructure for political activity, they will be incentivized to pursue profit maximization for the 
purpose of power instead of purely wealth. It follows that if they profit from anything, whether it 
be extremist recruitment, polarization, data collection, etc., they are automatically incentivized to 
continue such practices since it affords the resources to accrue greater power. The knock-on 
effect is that some of the managers themselves will be radicalized by these practices and then use 
the corporate capital available to them to support extremist factions and finance politicians who 
use extremist rhetoric. This then shifts the priority from profit maximization for its own sake to 
ideology, as we are seeing with the rise of neo-fascist populism in the United States as well as 
Brazil, Poland, Greece, Russia, and the United Kingdom.  
 We must then evaluate the consequences of corporate managerial political power 
in the current context. While the corporate managers have integrated into the plutocratic class 
and consolidated political power, they are facing an ideological schism. A significant portion of 
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the managerial class has become radicalized by “Trumpism” and are throwing their full support 
behind candidates that echo former President Trump, while the remaining more moderate 
corporate managers favor status quo Democrats and Republicans whose policies are similar. This 
has produced a hyper polarized public discourse enabled by the advanced media apparatus 
available to either faction, developing into a precursor to possible civil conflict. This is a direct 
result of the corrupting influence of corporate capital, which has eroded the effectiveness of 
public institutions’ ability to serve the broader population and sown deep distrust of the political 
establishment. It has taken a system designed to prioritize stability and compromise and turned it 
into a hyper partisan gridlock incapable of addressing even simple grievances. This is a crisis 
that threatens to unravel the republic and plunge the world right back into the revolutionary 
politics of the early 20th century. The Court’s decision to hold that political money is protected 
speech has resulted in a new aristocracy that is reinventing the very practices that inspired 
extreme populism to develop and led to the most vicious conflicts in history. We can distill this 
down to a class divide between the plutocrats and the rest, and further into an ideological divide 
over how best to solve the problem between the extreme left and the extreme right. That is to 
say, whether the ill-gotten gains of the aristocrats should be redistributed to the public through 
socialism or that they should be unilaterally managed by a strongman. Thus, we find the pattern 
but are no closer to finding the solution. 
A short-term solution would be to reinstate the FCC Fairness Doctrine, which required 
broadcast license holders to present controversial issues and events in an honest and equitable 
way and was eliminated in 1987. Further steps to disentangle public discourse from privately 
controlled media infrastructure would be necessary, especially given that much of this 
information permeates across the internet rather than television. While the effect of social media 
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is an important topic, television news still holds an air of legitimacy in many circles. I have 
emphasized the importance of media conglomerates in constructing our current scenario, so it 
follows that addressing their influence over public perception would be an important first step. It 
is also a decision that could be implemented with relatively few political obstacles, though it 
would require a president willing to appoint people to the FCC who are receptive to this 
prescription. At least it would be a simpler objective than trying to pass anything through 
Congress.  
The larger issue at hand is the already hyper polarized atmosphere dominating public 
discourse. There is no short-term solution for the current situation because it is the result of long-
term decision-making and policy. The federal system is facing a crisis of legitimacy and the only 
way to mitigate it is to properly address grievances at the scale afforded to its institutional 
infrastructure. This is most likely to be done through the executive branch, given that it can be 
controlled by one party, but this strategy is not reliable in the long-term since the administration 
turns over so frequently. For long-term stability we must turn to Congressional party politics, 
which is far more complex. The progressive wing of the Democratic Party has managed to 
generate a lot of grassroots public support that could serve as a launchpad for the party to expand 
its reach into underserved communities outside of city centers. These smaller districts are where 
conservative strategists focused their efforts in building Congressional power, so taking them 
back would be a logical step. It may be possible to generate support in these areas through a 
large infrastructure project, such as the recently announced plan the Biden administration wants 
to implement that would boost manufacturing to support clean energy initiatives, build out rural 
broadband, and construct new transit infrastructure (Tankersley 2021). The plan also calls for 
expanded social programs such as free community college, universal pre-k, and national paid 
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leave (Tankersley 2021). The tangible benefits of such a proposal are the strategies that will be 
most effective in garnering support from smaller districts that have been dominated by 
conservative politics in recent memory. The major hurdle is getting the proposal past Congress 
with the slight Democratic majority that is still beholden to its own right-wing party members. 
The fact is, though, that many of the grievances of American society are rooted in economic 
disparity and a lack of government support to fill in the gaps. A more robust welfare state 
coupled with government supported industry initiatives would go a long way to preventing 
further polarization and reduce the degree of control that corporate managers have over the 
workforce.  
The American federal system has immense resources at hand and is built to prioritize stability 
and resist despotism. We have arrived at the current situation because of decades of sustained 
effort to push us here and it is perhaps the greatest threat to the Republic we have seen in 
generations. The wealthy will always have power-hungry actors in their ranks and as a class they 
will always have political power. Doing away with them would not solve these problems, as 
evidenced by the many failures of communism to do just that. What can be done is utilizing the 
democratic system for what it, at least in theory, is designed to do: address public grievances 
through compromise. Money has corrupted this process and is attempting to eliminate 
compromise entirely. Reversing this institutional damage is an enormous task, especially since 
said institutions are the only organizations with the power to do so. It will take time and 
sustained effort to achieve and still may result in failure. History tells us the alternative would 
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